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Abstract
The paper deals with the problem of finding the best alternatives
on the basis of pairwise comparisons when these comparisons need not
be transitive. In this setting, we study a reinforcement urn model.
We prove convergence to the optimal solution when reinforcement of
a winning alternative occurs each time after considering three random
alternatives. The simpler process, which reinforces the winner of a
random pair does not always converges: it may cycle.
1 Introduction
In a pairwise comparison problem, one is given a set of alternatives, with
data about how they compare the ones to the others. In its purest form, on
which we focus in the present paper, we simply have, for any pair of distinct
alternatives, the information of which one “beats” the other. Such a data
set is called a tournament. Basic results on this structure can be found in
Moon [18].
For logical as well as practical reasons, binary relations are at the basis
of choice theory. Two classical examples are sport competition and majori-
tarian politics. Many sports involve by definition two players (or teams),
so that competition among any number of players must take the form of
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the aggregation of pairwise comparisons. In majority voting, a candidate is
socially preferred to another if and only if a majority of the voters prefer the
former to the latter. More generally, the prevalence of that kind of binary
relations can be traced back to specific features of efficient natural languages
(Rubinstein [25]).
If a chess player beats all the other players, he or she is clearly the best.
If a candidate cannot be defeated under majority rule by any challenger,
that “Condorcet” candidate can claim to be the best according to majority
rule.1 But if no alternative beats all the others, it is not clear how to define
the best alternatives. The problem of choosing from pairwise comparisons
has thus attracted the attention of scholars in various fields, most often from
the axiomatic, normative, point of view (David [5]; Fishburn [6]; Laslier [13];
Brandt et al. [1]).
In the present paper we tackle the same problem from an evolutionary
perspective instead of an axiomatic one. We consider dynamic processes
according to which, at each period in time, a small number (2 or 3) of alter-
natives are sampled, the tournament is played among these few alternatives,
and the winning alternative is reinforced in the sense that it will be sam-
pled with higher probability in the future. Where does such a mechanical
adaptive process go? Using a standard urn model, where reinforcing an
alternative is adding a colored ball to an urn, we obtain two results.
(i) If one samples three alternatives (distinct or not) at each date, the
process is able to discover the optimal solution of the tournament, that is
the unique probability distribution p∗ which is, in expectation, defeated by
no alternative. With probability one, the composition of the sampling urn,
which defines the probability pτ of choosing the various alternatives at time
τ , tends to p∗ when τ tends to infinity.
(ii) If one samples only two alternatives at each date, the process is not
able to discover the optimal solution, unless the solution is degenerated,
with one alternative defeating all the others. With probability one, the
composition of the sampling urn, which gives the probability pτ of choosing
the alternatives, concentrates on the support of the optimal solution p∗.
This means that all the alternatives which are played with zero probability
in the optimal solution are chosen with a probability going to 0. However the
composition of the urn may cycle, staying away from the optimal solution.
In some cases we even prove that it cycles with probability one.
The negative result (ii) echoes known results about the evolutionary
instability of mixed equilibria in evolutionary game theory. For instance
1This observation does not imply that the majority principle is good for Politics.
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cycling with probability one is proven by Posch [23] in a reinforcement urn
model for 2× 2 games.
The positive result (i) seems more original. In a study of imitation
processes in Matching Pennies games, Hofbauer and Schlag [11] observe that
players end up closer to the equilibrium if they sample several individual
before imitating: there is still cycling, but closer to the equilibrium. Our
results might be interpreted in the same spirit: learning slower leads to
more stability.
The techniques we use to derive these results are standard in the field
of adaptive processes with reinforcement; see Pemantle 2007 [22], and they
belong to the family of martingales techniques. The main ingredient of the
proof is the definition of a well chosen function of the process whose values
form a martingale (see (11)). We use the convergence theorem for positive
martingales to obtain some global asymptotic information about the process.
In the case of three alternatives we get fairly directly the convergence of the
process while for the case of two alternatives the convergence theorem has
to be complemented with a variance analysis to prove the non-convergence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary
notions about tournaments: definition and notation (2.1), the Markov chain
induced by the play of small-size tournaments at each date (2.2), the tour-
nament game which allows to define and to prove existence of the optimal
solution (2.3), and some further preliminary material (2.4, 2.5). Section 3
starts by the definition of urns and of the adaptive processes (3.1). Then,
in order to illustrate the argument in a simple way, a toy example is intro-
duced and treated according to its deterministic approximation (3.2). The
statement and proof of our main result on three-alternatives reinforcement is
found in (3.3) and two-alternatives reinforcement is treated in (3.4), before
a short conclusion (3.5).
2 Framework
2.1 Tournaments
Let X be a finite set. A tournament T on X is a complete and antisym-
metric binary relation. For any x and y in X, one and only one of the three
possibilities occurs: x = y, xT y, or y T x. When xT y we often say that x
beats y. Define the sets :
T+(x) = {y ∈ X : xTy}, T−(x) = {y ∈ X : yTx}. (1)
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The binary relation T is fixed throughout this paper. It is sometimes easier
to use the notation:
max{x, y} =
{
x
y
if xT y or x = y
if y T x.
An alternative which beats all other alternatives is called a Condorcet win-
ner. A tournament can have a Condorcet winner or not, but cannot have
two. The Top-Cycle of the tournament T is the smallest (by inclusion) set
Y ⊆ X such that:
∀ x ∈ X \ Y , ∃ y ∈ Y : yTx.
It is easily seen that such a set is unique and reduces to a singleton {c}
if and only if c is a Condorcet winner. The literature on tournaments and
formal political science has shown that the Top-Cycle is usually a very large
set (McKelvey [17]), and has proposed many refinements of this set (see [13]
for a survey).
2.2 A Markov chain
Let ∆(X) be the set of probability distributions on X and let p ∈ ∆(X).
The support of p is denoted by Supp(p). Given p, define a sequence (p[t])t∈IN
of probability distributions on X derived from p in the following way :
p[0] = p, (2)
p[t+1](x) = p[t](x) · p
(
T+(x) ∪ {x}
)
+ p[t](T+(x)) · p(x), (3)
for any t > 0, for any x ∈ X
The interpretation is that p[t] is the distribution of a random variable
ξ(t) ∈ X such that ξ(0) is chosen at random according to p and then, given
that ξ(t) = x, ξ(t + 1) is the winner (according to T ) of the comparison
between x and some alternative y randomly chosen in X according to p.
Therefore ξ(t+1) = x either because ξ(t) was already equal to x and y was
chosen in T+(x)∪{x} (first term in the above formula), or because ξ(t) was
in T+(x) and x was chosen according to p (second term). We call p the
“sampling” probability.
This process is usually considered with p uniform on X (Daniels [4],
Ushakov [28], Levchenkov [16], Slutzky and Volij [27], Chebotarev and
Shamis [2, 3]). We need the general version because, later in this paper,
p will be endogenous.
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Given p, the stationary distribution for this finite Markov chain exists
and is unique;2 we denote it by p[∞]. It is characterized by the fact that
Supp(p[∞]) ⊆ Supp(p) and, for any x in Supp(p),
p[∞](T+(x)) · p(x) = p[∞](x) · p(T−(x)). (4)
Notice that the inclusion Supp(p[∞]) ⊆ Supp(p) may be strict; indeed,
p[∞](x) = 0 when p(T−(x)) = 0, that is when x beats no alternative in
the support of p. More exactly, Supp(p[∞]) is the Top-Cycle of the restric-
tion of T to Supp(p); thus Supp(p[∞]) does not exactly really depends on
p but only on Supp(p). If p has full support, for instance in the usual case
where p is uniform, Supp(p[∞]) = TC(T ).
2.3 The tournament game
The tournament game is the two-player, symmetric, zero-sum game defined
by the strategy set X and the payoff function g(x, y) = +1 if xT y, g(x, y) =
0 if x = y, and g(x, y) = −1 if y T x. For p, q ∈ ∆(X) two probability
distributions on X, write:
g(p, q) =
∑
y∈X
g(x, y)p(x)q(y). (5)
From the definition, g is clearly antisymmetric: g(q, p) = −g(p, q).
The tournament game has been studied by graph theorists (Ficher and
Ryan [8, 9, 10]) and has more recently attracted attention of computer sci-
entists (Rivest and Chen [24]). As a model of majority voting and two-party
electoral competition, it studied in Social Choice theory and formal Political
Science (Moulin [19], Myerson [20, 21], Laslier [14, 15]). Remarkably, such a
game has a unique equilibrium. Here is the precise result that will be needed
in the sequel. (Fisher and Ryan [9] prove this result using linear algebra and
Laffond et al. [12] have a direct proof using a parity argument.)
Proposition 1 There exists a unique p∗ ∈ ∆(X) such that g(p∗, q) > 0 for
all q ∈ ∆(X). This p∗, called the optimal strategy, is also characterized by
the following : for all x ∈ X,
p∗(x) > 0 ⇐⇒ g(x, p∗(x)) = 0
p∗(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ g(x, p∗(x)) < 0.
2We state the results in this section without proofs. They are easily derived from
elementary theory of finite Markov chains and have already been noticed for p uniform in
the mentioned references.
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The support of the optimal strategy is called the Bipartisan Set of the
tournament: Supp(p∗) = BP (T ). This set is a subset of the Top Cycle and
the inclusion is often strict. For instance, in totally random tournaments,
the Top Cycle contains all the alternatives and the Bipartisan Set contains
only half of them (Fisher and Reeves [7]).
2.4 Two formulas
Before we go further and explain the relation between the game optimal
strategy and stationary probabilities, it is useful to state two technical for-
mulas. The following lemma describes the probabilities p[2] and p[3], obtained
after sampling two or three alternatives with the Markov chain defined in
Section 2.2, in term of the payoff function g.
Lemma 2 For any x ∈ X:
p[2](x) = p(x) · (1 + g(x, p)),
p[3](x) = p(x) ·
1 + 32g(x, p) + 12g(x, p)2 +∑
y∈X
p(y)g(x, y)g(y, p)
 .
Proof. First let us notice a useful equality. By definition (1) and (5)
g(x, p) = p(T+(x))− p(T−(x)), (6)
and, since p(T+(x)) + p(T−(x)) + p(x) = 1, we get:
1 + g(x, p) = 2p(T+(x)) + p(x). (7)
Let a and b be chosen according to p and let x = max{a, b}, then:
p[2](x) = Pr[a = x] · Pr[b ∈ T+(x) ∪ {x}] + Pr[a ∈ T+(x)] · Pr[b = x]
= p(x) ·
(
2p
(
T+(x)
)
+ p(x)
)
= p(x) · (1 + g(x, p)) .
For the second formula, let a, b and c be chosen according to p. An
alternative x appears as x = max {max{a, b}, c} in the two exclusive cases:
x = max{a, b}, and x = max{x, c} .
x T max{a, b}, and x = c .
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In the first line, the event x = max{a, b} has probability p[2](x) = p(x) · (1+
g(x, p)) so the probability of the first case is p(x) · (1 + g(x, p)) · p(T+(x) ∪
{x}). In the second line, the event xT max{a, b} has probability
p[2](T+(x)) =
∑
y∈T+(x)
p[2](y) =
∑
y∈T+(x)
p(y)(1 + g(y, p)),
therefore the probability p[3] is:
p[3](x) = p(x) · (1 + g(x, p)) ·
p(x) +∑
y∈T+(x)
p(y)
+ p(x)∑
y∈T+(x)
p(y)(1 + g(y, p))
= p(x)2 [1 + g(x, p)] + p(x)
∑
y∈T+(x)
p(y) [(2 + g(x, p)) + g(y, p)] .
Using the fact that 1+g(x,y)2 is 1 if y ∈ T
+(x), is 1/2 if y = x, and is 0 if not,
one finds:
p[3](x)
p(x)
=
∑
y
p(y) [(2 + g(x, p)) + g(y, p)]
1 + g(x, y)
2
= 12
∑
y
p(y) [(2 + g(x, p)) + g(y, p) + 2g(x, y) + g(x, p)g(x, y) + g(y, p)g(x, y)]
= 1 + 12g(x, p) +
1
2g(p, p) + g(x, p) +
1
2g(x, p)
2 + 12
∑
y
p(y)g(y, p)g(x, y)
= 1 + 32g(x, p) +
1
2g(x, p)
2 + 12
∑
y
p(y)g(y, p)g(x, y),
which is the announced formula. Q.E.D.
2.5 Relation between optimal strategies and stationary prob-
abilities
We first observe that the game optimal strategy p∗ satisfies a nice fixed-
point property if we take p[1] = p∗ as the sampling probability to build the
Markov chain, and that only an optimal strategy can be such a fixed point.
Proposition 3 Let p∗ be the optimal strategy for the tournament game,
then (p∗)[2] = (p∗)[∞] = p∗. Conversely, let p be such that p[2] = p, then p is
the optimal strategy for the tournament game restricted to the support of p.
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Proof. By lemma 2, p∗[2](x) = p∗(x)(1 + g(x, p∗), and, by proposition 1,
either p∗(x) = 0 or g(x, p∗) = 0.
Conversely if p[2](x) = p(x) = p(x)(1 + g(x, p)) then g(x, p) = 0 as soon
as p(x) > 0 and p is the optimal strategy on its support. Q.E.D.
3 Learning
With the previous background material in mind, we turn to the main result
of this paper. Instead of considering re-sampling at each date according to
a constant probability distribution, as is done in the previously described
Markov chains, we describe learning processes where winning alternatives
are reinforced at the level of the sampling probability. These processes can
be implemented with random urns.
3.1 Choice by reinforcement
An urn on X is a list n of strictly positive integers n(x), x ∈ X. The integer
n(x) is the “number of balls of color x in the urn n.” The set of such urns
on X is denoted by N , formally:
N = INX+ .
To each n ∈ N is associated the probability distribution n˜ on X defined by
n˜(x) =
n(x)∑
y∈X n(y)
.
When we write that the alternative x is picked in the urn n, we mean that
x is picked in X according to the probability n˜.
A random urn sequence is a sequence Uτ , τ ∈ IN of random variables on
N such that Uτ+1 is defined conditionally on Uτ . Here are three examples:
1. Two-alternatives reinforcement. Given a realization nτ ∈ N of Uτ , an
alternative x is picked in X according to the probability distribution
n˜τ
[2], and one ball of color x is added to the urn: nτ+1(w) = nτ (w)+1
and for all v 6= w, nτ+1(v) = nτ (v). This means that two alternatives,
say a and b are picked independently in the urn nτ , and are compared
according to T . The result of the comparison is x = max{a, b}, that is:
x = a if a = b or if aT b and x = b if b T a. Alternative x is reinforced.
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2. Three-alternatives reinforcement. Same thing as above, with the prob-
ability distribution n˜τ
[3]. This means that three alternatives, say a,
b and c are picked independently in X according to nτ ; a, b and
c are compared according to T in sequence and one ball of color
x = max {max{a, b}, c} is added to the urn. Remark that there are
only two cases : ranked alternatives where we reinforce the top one or
a cycle where we reinforce at random.
3. Fast reinforcement. Same thing as above, with the probability distri-
bution n˜τ
[∞], the stationary distribution for T when sampling is done
according to n˜τ .
Remark that the first two examples can be concretely implemented easily,
as described, but fast reinforcement cannot.
3.2 A motivational example
This section presents a simple non-rigorous argument to justify our focus on
three-alternatives reinforcement. Consider the simplest possible non trivial
tournament : a cycle of three alternatives A, B and C with AT B, B T C,
C T A. In order to evaluate the long term behavior of two-alternatives and
three-alternatives reinforcement, we use a deterministic continuous time mo-
tion corresponding to the limit of a large number of balls in the urn. We
write a(t), b(t) and c(t) the “number” of balls of each type and a˜(t) = a(t)/t,
b˜(t) = b(t)/t and c˜(t) = c(t)/t the corresponding probabilities.
For two-alternatives reinforcement we get :
a′ = a˜2 + 2a˜c˜
b′ = b˜2 + 2b˜a˜ (8)
c′ = c˜2 + 2c˜b˜
and we remark that
d
dt
(
ln a˜+ ln b˜+ ln c˜
)
= ddt (−3 ln t+ ln a+ ln b+ ln c)
= −
3
t
+
a˜2 + 2a˜c˜
a
+ . . .
= −
3
t
+
a˜+ 2c˜
t
+
b˜+ 2a˜
t
+
c˜+ 2b˜
t
= 0
so (a˜, b˜, c˜) cannot converge to the optimal probability independently of the
state at finite time.
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It is then natural to study three-alternatives reinforcement, for which :
a′ = a˜3 + 3a˜2c˜+ 3a˜c˜2 + a˜b˜c˜
b′ = b˜3 + 3b˜2a˜+ 3b˜a˜2 + a˜b˜c˜ (9)
c′ = c˜3 + 3c˜2b˜+ 3c˜b˜2 + a˜b˜c˜
and for the same quantity
d
dt
(
ln a˜+ ln b˜+ ln c˜
)
= −
3
t
+
a˜2 + 3a˜c˜+ 3c˜2 + b˜c˜
t
+ . . .
=
4(a˜2 + b˜2 + c˜2) + 4(a˜c˜+ b˜a˜+ c˜b˜)− 3
t
=
a˜2 + b˜2 + c˜2 − 2(a˜c˜+ b˜a˜+ c˜b˜)
t
and simple calculus shows that this last term is positive expect for a˜ =
b˜ = c˜ = 1/3. Then ln a˜ + ln b˜ + ln c˜ is an increasing negative function so it
converges. It is not difficult to see, using the divergence of
∫
1/tdt, that this
implies that a˜2+ b˜2+ c˜2− a˜c˜− b˜a˜− c˜b˜ converges to 0 and then that (a˜, b˜, c˜)
converges to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) (the details of the arguments will be given in
the rigorous proof of the next section).
With this example we can see that two-alternatives reinforcement should
not converge to the optimal probability even for a simple tournament and
when we neglect the effect of probabilistic noise while three-alternatives
reinforcement seems to work in that case. In the next section we will prove
that three-alternatives reinforcement actually converges for any tournament.
We will use the same idea of computing the variation of ln a˜+ln b˜+ln c˜ with
technical changes for the general tournament, the discrete time and the
probabilistic evolution.
3.3 Three-alternatives reinforcement and martingale tech-
nique
We will now prove the result about three-alternatives reinforcement:
Theorem 4 For any initial urn n0 ∈ N , the random urn sequence obtained
by three-alternatives reinforcement is such that the realization nτ , τ ∈ IN
almost surely verifies:
lim
τ→∞
n˜τ = p
∗.
The same proof will actually also give the first part of result about two-
alternatives reinforcement, which we thus state now:
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Theorem 5 For any initial urn n0 ∈ N , the random urn sequence obtained
by two-alternatives reinforcement is such that the realization nτ , τ ∈ IN
almost surely verifies:
∀x ∈ X, p∗(x) = 0⇒ lim
τ→∞
n˜τ (x) = 0.
The proof relies mainly on the study of a well chosen function of the state
of the urn. Let LD denotes a discrete logarithm: for integers 0 < a < b,
LD[a, b] = −
b−1∑
i=a
1
i
. (10)
Recall that at time τ ∈ IN, nτ (w) denotes the number of w-balls in the urn.
The total number of balls is increasing by 1 at each time, so
∑
w nτ (w) =
A + τ . The probability of drawing a w-ball is n˜τ (w) = nτ (w)/(A + τ).
Consider the quantity
µτ =
∑
w∈X
LD[nτ (w), A + τ ] · p
∗(w), (11)
that is the expected value, according to the optimal probability p∗, of the
discrete logarithm at time τ.
Proposition 6 For both two-alternatives and three-alternatives reinforce-
ment, the sequence µτ , τ ∈ IN is a negative sub-martingale. More precisely
we have, for two-alternatives reinforcement:
E [µτ+1 − µτ | nτ ] =
g(p∗, n˜τ )
A+ τ
.
and for three-alternatives reinforcement:
E [µτ+1 − µτ | nτ ]
=
1
A+ τ
(
1
2g(p
∗, n˜) + 12
∑
w∈X
g(w, n˜)2p∗(w) +
∑
v
n˜(v)g(p∗, v)(1 + g(v, n˜))
)
.
Proof. We will write p for n˜τ and let i denote either 2 or 3. From τ to
τ +1, one and only one ball is added. This ball has type w with probability
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p[i](w). Thus:
E [µτ+1 − µτ | nτ ]
= −
∑
w∈X
p[i](w)
∑
v 6=w
1
A+ τ
· p∗(v) +
[
1
A+ τ
−
1
nτ (w)
]
· p∗(w)

=
−1
A+ τ
+
∑
w∈X
p[i](w)
1
nτ (w)
p∗(w)
=
−1
A+ τ
+
∑
w∈X
p[i](w)
p(w)
p∗(w)
A+ τ
Where in the last line we used the definition p(w) = nτ (w)/(A + τ). Using
the formula for p[i] of lemma 2, it comes, for two-alternatives:
E [µτ+1 − µτ | nτ ]
=
−1
A+ τ
+
∑
w∈X
(1 + g(w, p))
p∗(w)
A+ τ
=
g(p∗, p)
A+ τ
.
which is always non-negative. Furthermore, g(p∗, p) = 0 implies, by the first
part of proposition 1, that Supp(p) ⊆ Supp(p∗).
For three-alternatives, we have:
E [µτ+1 − µτ | nτ ]
=
−1
A+ τ
+
∑
w∈X
(
1 + 32g(w, p) +
1
2g(w, p)
2 +
∑
v
p(v)g(w, v)g(v, p)
)
p∗(w)
A+ τ
.
one can re-arrange:
(A+ τ)E [µτ+1 − µτ | nτ ]
= 32g(p
∗, p) + 12
∑
w∈X
g(w, p)2p∗(w) +
∑
v
p(v)g(p∗, v)g(v, p)
= 12g(p
∗, p) + 12
∑
w∈X
g(w, p)2p∗(w) +
∑
v
p(v)g(p∗, v)(1 + g(v, p)).
And all the terms in this sum are non-negative. The sum can be 0 only if
both Supp(p) ⊆ Supp(p∗), and g(w, p) = 0 for all w in the support of p∗,
which implies p = p∗ by the uniqueness in Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
12
We are now able to prove the two results of the beginning of the section.
Proof of Theorems 4 and 5. We consider for this proof either two or
three alternatives reinforcement. We have:
E[µτ ] = E[µ0] + E
[
τ∑
t=1
µt − µt−1
]
(12)
= E[µ0] + E
[
τ∑
t=1
E [µt − µt−1|µt−1]
]
. (13)
By Proposition 6, µτ is a negative sub-martingale, so it converges almost
surely to an integrable random variable µ∞ (see Corollary VII.4.1 and
VII.4.2 in [26]). Furthermore, the right hand side is an increasing nega-
tive sequence so it converges to a finite value. In the left hand side, the sum
is an increasing sequence of positive random variables so by the monotonous
convergence theorem (Theorem II.6.1 in [26]) we can take the limit inside
the expectation. Hence E [
∑∞
t=1 E[µt − µt−1|µt−1]] = limE[µτ ] − E[µ0] is
finite and so
∑∞
t=1 E[µt − µt−1|µt−1] is almost surely finite.
Let f [2](p) = g(p∗, p) and f [3](p) = g(p, p∗) +
∑
w∈X g(w, p)
2p∗(x). The
simplex ∆(X) is embedded in IRX so we use the L∞ distance. With this
distance, f [i] is continuous and d(n˜τ , n˜τ+1) 6
1
A+τ almost surely. Denote by
B(p, η) the ball of center p and radius η.
Now consider a single realization of the urn process. Since X is a finite
set, ∆(X) is compact, so let n˜∞ be an accumulation point for n˜τ . We will
show that necessarily f [i](n˜∞) = 0. Looking for a contradiction, suppose
f [i](n˜∞) > 0.
Since f [i] is continuous, let ǫ, η > 0 be such that ∀p ∈ B(n˜∞, η), f
[i](p) >
ǫ. Let φ be a sub-sequence such that ∀τ, n˜φ(τ) ∈ B(n˜∞, η/2) and φ(τ +1) >
(1 + η)φ(τ). Then:
∞∑
t=0
E[µt+1 − µt|nt] >
∞∑
t=0
1
2(A+ t)
f [i](n˜t) (14)
>
∞∑
τ=0
1
2(A+ φ(τ))
⌊(1+η/2)φ(τ)⌋∑
t=φ(τ)
f [i](n˜t) (15)
>
∞∑
τ=0
1
2(A+ φ(τ))
⌊(1 + η/2)φ(τ)⌋ǫ (16)
The right hand side of the last line is infinite. We already proved that
the left hand side is almost surely finite. This contradiction proves that all
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the accumulation points of n˜t are zeros of f
[i]. It follows that f [i](n˜t) → 0
almost surely. We have seen in the proof of Proposition 6 that this fact
implies exactly the theorems. Q.E.D.
3.4 Two-alternatives reinforcement and variance estimates
In this section, we study in detail the two-alternatives reinforcement. The
main idea is to study the variance of µ∞ conditionally on the state at a large
time t.
Theorem 7 For any initial urn n0 ∈ N , the random urn sequence obtained
by two-alternatives reinforcement is such that:
1. almost surely, for all alternatives x such that p∗(x) = 0, n˜τ (x) → 0
when τ →∞;
2. with positive probability, the realized sequence n˜τ , τ ∈ IN has no limit
as τ →∞;
3. if T is such that ∀x, p∗(x) > 0 (in other words, BP (T ) = X) then,
with probability one, n˜τ , τ ∈ IN has no limit.
To simplify notation, in this section we let the process start at τ 6= 0
so that τ always denote the number of ball in the urn (i.e. A = 0). We
will also only consider two-alternatives reinforcement in this section. Recall
the piece of notation Supp(p∗) = BP . Also recall from the last section
that µτ is a negative submartingale so it has an almost sure limit µ∞. Let
φ =
∑
x∈BP p
∗(x) log p∗(x) be the value of µ∞ when n˜τ converges to p
∗.
The first point is the following variance estimate :
Lemma 8 Let τ > 0 and let ǫτ (x) = p
∗(x)/n˜τ (x)− 1. We have
E[(µτ+1 − µτ )
2|Fτ ] =
1
τ2
∑
x∈BP
n˜[2](x)ǫτ (x)
2 (17)
Proof. This is a straightforward computation :
E[(µτ+1 − µτ )
2|Fτ ] =
∑
x
n˜[2]τ (x)
(
−
∑
y
p∗(y)
1
τ
+ p∗(x)
1
n(x)
)2
(18)
=
∑
x
n˜[2]τ (x)
1
τ2
(−1 +
p∗(x)
n˜(x)
)2 (19)
=
1
τ2
∑
x
n˜[2](x)ǫτ (x)
2 (20)
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Q.E.D.
The main point is the factor 1τ2 that make the series of those terms
summable (once a small control on ǫ is provided). Thus the variance of µ∞
conditioned on Fτ will be of order ǫ
2/τ . Thus with hight probability µ∞
will be close to µτ so that if µτ is far enough from φ, then µ∞ 6= φ.
We will first consider the case where BP 6= X. In this case we have
E[µτ+1−µτ | Fτ ] =
g(p∗,n˜τ )
τ > g0 ·n˜(BP
c) > 0 (where g0 = infy∈BP c g(p
∗, y))
so we need an estimate of n˜(BP ).
Lemma 9 Suppose that there exists π ∈ (0, 1) such that, at each time τ the
probability of adding a ball in BP c is inferior to π · n˜τ (BP
c). Then we have
for all τ > τ0,
E[n˜τ (BP
c) | Fτ ] 6
τ∏
t=τ0+1
t+ π − 1
t
E[n˜τ0 ]
6
(τ0
τ
)1−pi
n˜τ0 .
Proof. The first line comes from a straightforward induction
E[n˜τ ] =
1
τE[nτ−1] +
1
τE[nτ − nτ−1]
= τ−1τ E[n˜τ−1] +
1
τE
[
E[nτ − nτ−1 | Fτ−1]
]
6
τ−1
τ E[n˜τ−1] +
1
τE[πn˜τ−1]
6
τ+pi−1
τ E[n˜τ−1]
and for the second line we have
log
τ∏
t=τ0+1
t+ π − 1
t
6
τ∑
τ0+1
log(1 +
π − 1
t
)
6
τ∑
τ0+1
π − 1
t
6 (π − 1) log(
τ
τ0
)
Q.E.D.
Now we are able to prove the third point of the theorem.
Proof of theorem 7, case BP c 6= ∅. Remark that for δ > 0 small
enough and τ0 big enough, the set
S = {n ∈ N s.t n(X) > τ0 and |φ−
∑
x
p∗(x)LD(n(x), n(X))| 6 δ}
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verifies :
• ∀n ∈ S,∀x ∈ BP, |p∗(x)/n˜(x)− 1| 6 1
• ∀n ∈ S,∀x ∈ BP c, 1 + g(x, n˜) 6 π
for some π > 1− infx∈BP c g(p
∗, x).
Let us assume that n˜τ0 ∈ S, (which clearly happens with positive prob-
ability). Let T be the first time after τ0 such that n˜τ /∈ S. T is a stopping
time so µτ∧T is still a submartingale, let us call it µ
′
τ . Furthermore, up to
time T , we have
E[µτ+1 − µτ | Fτ ] =
g(p∗, n˜τ )
τ
6
n˜τ (BP )
τ
,
and thus
E[µ′τ+1 − µ
′
τ | Fτ0 ] 6
1
τ
E[n˜τ (BP )1{T6τ} | Fτ0 ]
6 τ1−pi0 τ
pi−2n˜τ0(BP ).
Now let µ′∞ denote the almost sure limit of µτ∧T = µ
′
τ . Remark that if
|φ − µ∞|(ω) < δ then T (ω) = ∞ and thus µ∞(ω) = µ
′
∞(ω). It is therefore
enough to show that, with positive probability φ− δ < µ′∞ < φ.
Note that µ′ is a bounded submartingale, so it also converges in L1 and
L2 toward µ′∞. Thus
E[µ′∞ − µ
′
τ0 | Fτ ] =
∞∑
t=τ0
E[µ′t+1 − µ
′
t | Fτ0 ]
6
∞∑
t=τ0
τ1−pi0 t
pi−2n˜τ0(BP )
6 Cn˜τ0(BP ),
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and
Var(µ′∞ | Fτ0) 6
∞∑
t=τ0
Var(µ′t+1 | Fτ0)
6
∞∑
t=τ0
E[(µ′t+1 − µ
′
t)
2 | Fτ0 ]
6
∞∑
t=τ0
1
t2
∑
x∈BP
n˜[1](x)ǫt(x)
2
6 C
1
τ0
.
Finally consider a τ0 large enough so that
1
τ0
≪ δ. It is clear that with a
positive probability, n˜τ0 ≪ δ and |µτ0 − φ| is close to δ/2. Under this event
we see that |φ−µ′∞| is a random variable with expectation close to δ/2 and
variance small with respect to δ so |µ′∞−φ| has a positive probability to be
in [δ/4, 3δ/4] which proves the theorem. Q.E.D.
Now we turn to the case where X = BP . The idea will be similar, with
Lemma 8 being the core argument. The main simplification comes from
the fact that in this case g(p∗, p) = 0 for all p so µ is a martingale and
Lemma 9 will no longer be needed. However, in order to prove that µ∞ is
almost surely different from φ, we will need an almost sure lower bound on
|φ − µτ | which will come from a careful analysis of the difference between
discrete and real logarithms. Finally since the almost sure bound that we
will get will be much worse than the one we were able to have with positive
probability, we will need to be more careful in our use of Lemma 8.
First recall the following well known approximation result :
Proposition 10 Let k > 0, there exists a constant γ (Euler’s constant)
such that
log(k + 1) + γ −
1
2
∞∑
i=k+1
1
i2
6
k∑
i=1
1
i
6 log(k + 1) + γ −
1
2
∞∑
i=k+2
1
i2
(21)
Furthermore when k tends to infinity,
∞∑
i=k+1
1
i2
∼
1
k
(22)
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This proposition implies the following corollary:
Corollary 11 Let T be a tournament on the set X such that BP = T .
There exists c > 0 such that, for any urn n ∈ N ,∑
x
p∗(x)LD(n(x), τ) 6 φ−
c
τ
. (23)
Furthermore, writing ǫ(x) = p∗(x)/n˜(x)− 1, if we restrict ourselves to large
enough τ (with ǫ staying bounded) the constant c can be taken as close as
we want to :
|X| − 1 +
∑
x∈BP ǫ(x)
2
(24)
Proof. This is a straightforward computation using the definition of LD.
Q.E.D.
We also need a control of ǫ in term of µ
Lemma 12 Almost surely, for any time τ∑
x∈BP
[n˜τ (x) + p
∗(x)/2]ǫτ (x)
2
6 φ− µτ (25)
Proof. We have
φ− µτ >
∑
x∈BP
p∗(x)[log p∗ − log p] (26)
>
∑
x∈BP
p∗(x)(ǫτ (x) + ǫτ (x)
2/2) (27)
>
∑
x∈BP
p∗(x)ǫτ (x)
2/2 +
∑
x∈BP
n˜τ (x)(1 + ǫτ (x))ǫτ (x) (28)
>
∑
x∈BP
(p∗(x)/2 + n˜τ (x))ǫτ (x)
2 (29)
because
∑
x∈BP n˜τ (x)ǫ(x) =
∑
x∈BP p
∗(x)− n˜τ (x) = 0. Q.E.D.
Together, the last lemmas have the following consequence
Lemma 13 Let τ0 > 0 large enough such that |φ − µτ0 | >
5
τ0−1
, then there
exists π > 0 such that, with probability at least π,
∀τ > τ0, |φ− µτ | >
1
τ0
.
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Proof. Let d = |φ − µτ0 | and let T = inf{τ > τ0|φ − µτ > 2d or φ − µτ 6
d/5}. T is a stopping time so µ′τ = µτ∧T is still a sub-martingale ; by
definition it is also bounded so it converges almost surely and in all Lp. Let
µ′∞ denote its limit. We will show that P(µ
′
∞ ∈ (d/5, 2d)) > π > 0 for some
π. Remark that, since µ makes vanishing steps, we are only interested in
the behaviour of µ close to φ, so we can restrict ourself to small ǫ.
As long as τ < T , by definition we have φ − µτ 6 2d and thus by
Lemma 12,
∑
x(p
∗(x)/2 + n˜τ (x))ǫτ (x)
2 6 2d. For ǫ small enough, this
implies
∑
x n˜
[1]
τ ǫ(x)2 6 2d and thus, by Lemma 8:
∀τ > τ0,E[(µ
′
t+1 − µ
′
t)
2|F ] 6
2d
τ2
. (30)
Summing up to infinity (recall that µ′ has constant expectation):
Var(µ′∞ − µ
′
τ0 |Fτ0) =
∞∑
τ=τ0
E[(µ′τ+1 − µ
′
τ )
2|Fτ0 ] (31)
6
∞∑
τ=τ0
2d
τ2
(32)
6 2d
1
τ0 − 1
(33)
6
2
5
d2 (34)
where we used the hypothesis d > 5τ0−1 in the last line.
Remark that, since µT∧τ is bounded, E[µ′∞] = d. Moreover notice that a
random variable with expectation d which never takes value in the interval
(d/2, 2d) has at least variance d2/2. Since Var(µ′∞|Fτ ) 6
2
5d
2, we have
P(µ′ ∈ (d/2, 2d)) > 1/10 and on this event, T = ∞ so |φ − µ| has never
reached d/2 > 1τ0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7, case BP = ∅. First note that if n˜τ converges,
it has to be toward a fixed point. It is easy to see that the fixed points
of the dynamics are exactly the optimal strategies p∗Y corresponding to all
subtournaments Y ⊆ X. (This of course includes p∗ = p∗X itself.) For
Y ( X,
∑
x p
∗
X(x) log p
∗
Y (x) = −∞ so by the using the Markov inequality
on µ we see that convergence to those fixed points is impossible. Therefore
we only have to rule out convergence towards p∗X .
We first consider the case |X| > 12. Then by Corollary 11, for any τ
large enough, µτ almost surely verifies the hypothesis of Lemma 13. Fix any
19
suitable τ0, by Lemma 13, P(n˜τ → p∗) 6 P(∃τ > τ0||φ−µτ | 6 1/τ0) 6 1−π.
On the event that |φ−µτ | does reach 1/τ0 at time τ1, we can use Lemma 13
at time τ1 to get P(n˜τ → p∗) 6 (1−π)2. By induction we get P(n˜τ → p∗) = 0
which proves the theorem.
For the case 3 6 |X| 6 11 (a non trivial tournament has at least 3
elements), consider any τ0 large enough. By Corollary 11 we have |φ−µτ0 | >
1/τ0. Let T = inf{τ > τ0||φ − µτ | 6 1/2τ0or|φ − µτ | >
5
τ0
. The event
{T =∞ or |φ− µT | >
5
τ0
} has probability at least 1/9 and if |φ− µT | >
5
τ0
we can apply Lemma 13 at time T so the conclusion of Lemma 13 is still true
with 1/τ0 replaced by 1/2τ0 and we can use the same induction as before to
prove the theorem. Q.E.D.
3.5 Conclusion
We have found the behavior of learning process designed to discover the
“best” alternatives in a tournament. Learning is achieved through the fol-
lowing idea. An alternative which is considered as “good” at some date is
reinforced for the future in the sense that one (slightly, and less and less)
increases the probability for this alternative to be considered: reinforcement
updates the sampling, or “prior” probability. The test according to which
an alternative is considered as a good one at time t rests on comparing a
few randomly chosen alternatives.
We found a very different behavior between the processes where rein-
forcement occurs after sampling two or three alternatives. With three al-
ternatives, the process converges almost surely to a well-defined limit that
has a nice interpretation in term of the tournament game: it is the optimal
strategy for this game. One can therefore say that this form of learning is
“successful ”. With two alternatives, the picture is more complicated. The
learning process “succeeds ” in finding the Bipartisan set (a set which has
been argued to be more important in term of social choice than the numeri-
cal values of the optimal probabilities [14]), but not the optimal probabilities
themselves. We conjecture that the almost sure non-convergence happens
for all tournaments and not only when BP = X.
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